By T. M. ScanlonT. M. Scanlon deals a professional protection of normative cognitivism--the view that there are irreducibly normative truths approximately purposes for motion. He responds to 3 regularly occurring objections: that such truths might have troubling metaphysical implications; that we might don't have any manner of realizing what they're; and that the function of purposes in motivating and explaining motion couldn't be defined if accepting a end approximately purposes for motion have been one of those trust. Scanlon solutions the 1st of those objections inside a common account of ontological dedication, using to arithmetic in addition to normative judgments. He argues that the tactic of reflective equilibrium, effectively understood, presents an sufficient account of the way we come to understand either normative truths and mathematical truths, and that the belief of a rational agent explains the hyperlink among an agent's normative ideals and his or her activities. even if each assertion approximately purposes for motion has a determinate fact worth is a query to be spoke back by way of an total account of purposes for motion, in normative phrases. because it turns out not likely that there's such an account, the security of normative cognitivism provided this is certified: statements approximately purposes for motion could have determinate fact values, however it isn't transparent that every one of them do. alongside the way in which, Scanlon bargains an interpretation of the excellence among normative and non-normative claims, a brand new account of the supervenience of the normative at the non-normative, an interpretation of the belief of the relative energy of purposes, and a safety of the strategy of reflective equilibrium.